

forces and the Phalangists in Lebanon. If the Awwali river is going to be as efficient a line of IDF deployment as it has been in separating so far Haddad's men from the Phalangists, we had better look for another line. The Phalangists are forever trying to infiltrate the south, to raid the refugee camps in the Sidon region and to show the inhabitants, as well as Haddad and the IDF, who the real boss is. Some of Haddad's men, too, led by "Haddad's Eli Hobeika," a young man nicknamed "Arnab," keep trying to kill Palestinians. We may be wise to remember the name "Arnab," for events in Ain el-Hilweh might soon give its owner the same kind of reputation that Eli Hobeika "earned" in Sabra and Shatila.

The IDF, which was forced to bring in tanks in order to disperse a riot in the refugee camp of Bourj al-Shemali after a local youngster had been shot dead by an Israeli patrol there, has at least twice clashed with Haddad's men in the Sidon region. In one incident, one of Haddad's armored cars insisted on chasing a private car along the coastal road. When an Israeli officer blocked the way of the armored car, Haddad's men tried to run him over. The officer very nearly opened fire on them. Only when the Israeli commander of the Haddad men was brought in, was order restored. In the other incident, Haddad's men put up a private checkpoint on the Sidon fishing pier next to an IDF road block and began to extract "taxes" from the fishermen. When one of the fishermen refused to pay up, he was shot and badly injured. A scuffle broke out over this with the IDF, at which shots were very nearly fired. Such incidents are going to increase, because Haddad's men cover the job of the IDF.

The relaxation of the Israeli army's control over them has not resulted in a discussion about Haddad's future status in the

southern unit of the Lebanese army, but only about his imminent return to that army. The moment Haddad will cease to receive his salary, his equipment and his men's training from Israel, mutual relations will come to an end. If he will not be able to get help from Israel, he will not help Israel. Even if the implementation of the agreement with Lebanon is delayed and cooperation with Haddad in the Israeli-controlled areas continues, the alienation between the major's forces and the IDF will get worse.

Meanwhile, Israeli soldiers—ordered to man road blocks, fight things out with Haddadists and Phalangists, guard Ansar camp, or drive along the coastal road which is liable to frequent attacks—are preferring to sacrifice their leave rather than risk a dangerous bus journey. Two weeks ago, veteran paratroopers were seen to embrace one another upon their arrival back in Metulla as if they had won a battle or been released from jail, instead of just having completed their service in Lebanon. . . .

### MOSSAD: AN INTELLIGENCE FAILURE

*One branch of the Israeli intelligence services, Mossad, came up for re-appraisal in an article in the Israeli monthly Monitin (April 1983) by Kol Israel radio reporter Haim Hecht. Hecht looked at the institution's role in the Lebanon war, its much earlier moves—as far back as 1975—to involve itself in Lebanese internal politics, and at the rivalry between Mossad and Military Intelligence:*

Tuesday, August 23, 1983, 1:50 am:  
Kamal Assad, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, announces: Bashir Gemayel is the next president of Lebanon. Outside

FROM THE ISRAELI PRESS 179

the election hall in the car-park of the Faidiyeh military college, a group of six armed men are listening to the direct broadcast. Three of them are Bashir's closest assistants in the Phalangist headquarters and the other three are Israelis. "Bashir Gemayel is the president-elect!" cries the Lebanese radio broadcaster. The group in the car-park jumps up. One of the Israelis points his Kalashnikov upwards and shoots hysterically into the sky. The second Israeli falls into the arms of Bashir's assistant and the two dance together for joy. The same night a party takes place in honor of the new president-elect. Rafi [Rafael Eitan] wanders around the party looking somewhat detached. People at the party seem drunk with victory, shaking hands as if saying, "We've done it! They won the championship." A senior army officer who attended the party (having been almost forced to attend) mutters: "Look at them; each one of them thinks that he is a mini Edgar Hoover. They made a king in the republic of the absurd, and they can't sober up. We shall suffer from this man."

Bashir reached the presidential chair through a violent path, and the Israelis served as his fists. Mossad dragged the state of Israel into a violent and bloody adventure. According to Mossad, Israel would begin to reap political and military gains with Bashir's election. The first days after the "elections" proved that the fruits of the "victory" were not guaranteed at all. The president-elect began talking differently, in a manner not at all pleasant to Israeli ears. On two occasions he simply made fun of and insulted the Chief of Staff, Rafael Eitan, and a group of senior officers who were with him. The Mossad people, who were supposed to deliver the goods, defended Bashir, and tried to find excuses and explanations. They haven't sobered up yet.

On Tuesday, September 14, 1983, a strong explosion destroyed the Phalangist headquarters in Ashrafiyeh. The president-elect, Bashir, was killed. Prime Minister Begin published a short notice: Israel has lost a dear friend. At the same time, smiling Israeli officers were raising their glasses and sighing with relief, "Thank God we are rid of that reptile." But the spirit of Bashir was still alive among the Phalangists who entered the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. The massacre was unavoidable.

"Insensitivity—my ass!" says a member of Military Intelligence (MI) who was a close observer of ties between Mossad and the Phalangists. "Just as one and one are two, Bashir and the Phalangists plus governing power equals Sabra and Shatila. It's a shame that in the end it's not the right people who pay for it." Several paragraphs in the Kahan report give the whole story: "... Mossad was responsible for contacts with the Phalangists and at different times had very close contacts with the leaders of the Phalange. . . . From documents presented to the [Kahan] commission and testimonies heard we learn that Mossad and MI did not agree on the subject of ties with the Phalangists. Affected by the continuous contacts with the leadership of the Phalange, Mossad had a very positive opinion concerning tightening of relations with the Phalange. . . . In the testimony of the head of Mossad on 27 December 1982, he said, among other things, 'that Mossad tried to present the matter objectively but since it was the body in charge of maintaining the contacts, I admit that subjective relations had been created. I must accept this. In contacts one speaks with people, relations develop.' On the other hand, MI emphasized in its estimation the danger of relations with the Phalange mainly because they are unreliable and weak in military

power and for other reasons."

What had happened, and how was it that the State of Israel chose to accept the "subjective" information in spite of the warnings of MI and other bodies in the Army?

"Ever since 1932, the Maronite Christian majority in Lebanon has been weakening. The Lebanese constitution has not changed and it gives the Christian minority great political advantages. With this background the civil war was unavoidable. The Christians wanted to maintain their dominant position and had a real problem of protecting their physical existence. These facts created a good basis for building ties with the State of Israel."

One of the basic assumptions of the Israeli intelligence community is that it is possible to bypass the strength and influence of the Arab world by creating alliances and contacts with ethnic and political minorities in the Middle East. In the days of the Maarakh governments a "functional" alliance was made with the Phalange, and there is no evidence to show that the then government had any great hopes of the alliance. Mossad was in charge of contacts with the Phalange. "We will help them to help themselves" was the way the then Minister of Defense, Shimon Peres, explained the contacts with the Christians in the north of Lebanon. The idea, of course, was to maintain secret contacts, and the fact of giving them military aid was also kept quiet in spite of the fact that this aid included tanks and heavy artillery.

The first contacts with the Christians [i.e., the organized "Christian" militias] in South Lebanon were established in the mid-70s, when Raful was Commander of the Northern Command. Raful made these contacts out of instinct. A supportive Christian belt in South Lebanon was a "safety belt" for us, he said. General

Avigdor (Yanush) Ben-Gal, who replaced Raful in the Northern Command, added to Raful's instinct momentum and sophistication. It was he who created Major Haddad, not Haddad the man, but Haddad as representing a system: Israeli intervention in Lebanon with maximum control.

The same kitchen fed both the Christians in the north and Haddad's men in the south. Both received tanks and heavy artillery. Both received Israeli-made khaki uniforms. The Christians in the north had a badge attached to the pocket, while the Christians in the south attached the badge to their shoulders.

At general staff meetings and in the Ministry of Defense, the patrons of both systems tried to establish goals for their clients and to get budgets for them. At this stage the Israeli political milieu was not yet required to decide between the two conceptions, and the work continued in two parallel lines: Mossad in the north of Lebanon and the Army in the south. In September 1977, Major Haddad's men were part of an Israeli military operation for the first time—conquering Tel Sueifa—known later as the "cooperative operation." What had been until the "cooperative operation" humanitarian aid, now became open military assistance given to Haddad's militias by the Israeli army. After the Litani Operation in 1978,\* Haddad became an element that even Bashir, who used to treat the Major with contempt, had to take into account. But, as was to be discovered later, Bashir's school has solutions which are simple, fast and strong, but not elegant. Bashir wanted Haddad's head, and there was someone who told him that it would be okay.

\* In which Haddad's men were responsible for a number of murders, particularly in the town of Khiyyam—Ed.

FROM THE ISRAELI PRESS 181

The Kahan report does not mention the date of July 7, 1980. But that was definitely a key date in the developments that lead to Sabra and Shatila. It was on that day that Bashir and his men liquidated the Chamounist militia.\*\* It was a brutal massacre in the best mafia tradition. But this time the Phalange did not massacre rivals: they shot their own brothers and allies. The Phalange entered the Country Club in Beirut that morning and shot any moving target. Fathers, mothers and children were massacred at the pool. It was Bashir's intimate friends who committed the brutal murder of Chamoun's family. The same friends stood two years later in the car park of Faidiyeh; the same friends who danced for joy, embraced by Israelis. The events of July 7 stand in the face of all those who told the Kahan commission, "We were surprised, we didn't know, we didn't think they were capable of..."

If there were different views concerning the Phalange within MI up to July 7, 1980, from that day onwards MI adopted a clear position, maintaining its warnings of the danger of close ties with the Phalange, of their small number and their limited military potential, and concluding that the Christians had no chance of ever again becoming the dominant force in Lebanon. On the other hand, the assumption was that if there should ever be another stable Christian regime in Lebanon, it would be another pro-Eastern Arab state. MI regarded the Mossad position—that envisaged a pro-Western Lebanon under the leadership of Bashir and a peace treaty with Israel—as a fantasy and an illusion.

How could such a gap between the positions of Mossad and MI develop? The explanation is so simple it is hard to believe.

\*\*Of past Lebanese President Camille Chamoun—Ed.

It is almost ridiculous. MI people are experts in Middle East studies who evaluate the situation; they read newspapers and speeches and intelligence reports, including Mossad reports. Aided by all these, they crystallize a sterile evaluation, an analysis free of personal inclinations or of any emotional influence.

The story of Mossad was told, in short, in the words of the head of Mossad to the Kahan commission: "Mossad did its best to present the topic and to look at it objectively, but since Mossad was directly in charge of the contacts, I accept the assumption that subjective relations developed. I must accept this. Within such relations one speaks with people, relations develop." "The Mossad people in Jounieh sat inside Bashir's bottom," is the way a senior member of the intelligence community defined the situation. He can see no other way to explain why every question was considered by Mossad according to the criteria of "what Bashir says."

The story of Mossad in Beirut reminds me in a frightening way of the spy stories in the cinema, of the spy who falls in love with the woman agent of the other side. No doubt the Mossad agents in Lebanon fell under the spell of their partners. Eating together, having all-night parties and gambling together at Jounieh Casino created a situation in which the Israeli agents, who were supposed to warn and supply estimates and information concerning the Phalange, were caught in a strong emotional bond with their clients. It is well known that the Phalange are very good at public relations. As a journalist, I can say from my own personal experience that the way I was received at their headquarters in Beirut made me forget for a few long moments all those chapters of the civil war that cried out a thousand times that I was sitting among cold-blooded murderers. The conversations

were conducted with the best French manners; and the Dior perfume on the handsome secretaries affected me; it was impossible not to admire the quotations they brought into the political discussion from the writings of philosophers and theoreticians. I am a journalist and I may be blinded by the cover of the Sorbonne and Dior, but how was it possible that the Mossad people, agents trained for their mission, were led astray? How was it possible that a state institution, a body that represents human, technological, economic and administrative resources assembled to estimate developments in the political and strategic arena failed in this manner? To the elements of human weakness mentioned above, we should add another element that will bring us closer to understanding this failure: professional pride. Mossad wanted to succeed at any price. The heads of Mossad had known several failures and urgently needed a new project; they wanted to present Israel with a strategic success. Mossad genuinely believed that the systems used by the Shah of Iran, by Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and General Delimi of Morocco could function and enable us to control Lebanon. In their position papers, when they tried to persuade the political milieu, they continually mentioned Hafez al-Assad, a president who represents an ethnic minority of 10 percent and governs his country with success.

We shall give military backing to Bashir and success shall be ours. They did not grasp that Sabra and Shatila were also sure to take place because their position papers were the sure prescription for the massacre in the camps. Mistaken assumptions, the desire to present a success and human weaknesses, all made up Mossad's conception. In the summer of 1981 Mossad's position gradually became the state position, and this process had to end with the

war in Lebanon.

There is another incident in the list of Mossad's failures that should be mentioned here: the story of the shooting down of the helicopters at Jabal Sannin, later known as the "missiles crisis." According to Bashir, the Syrians were the enemy, the biggest obstacle to his control of Lebanon. The Phalange understood that Israel, that is, the Israeli army, was the only force that could solve the Syrian problem for them; thus, Bashir had an obvious interest in getting Israel involved with the Syrians. This was openly said at the Phalange headquarters. Moreover, from 1982 the Phalange took several steps which were clearly a provocation. Any agent after a two-month beginners' course would have understood that he should have sent warning signs to Jerusalem. The warnings sent by the Mossad people from Jounieh were very "watery," and that is an understatement; and Bashir continued sending his men to the Bekaa area. The Syrians did not like this since they regarded the Bekaa as the territory in which they have exclusive influence, and as a most important strategic area, fearing that in the case of war Israel would make use of the Bekaa to bypass the Syrian army and threaten Damascus directly. Bashir read the map correctly. The Jews made the mistake. The Phalange entered Zahleh [in the Bekaa] and the clash with the Syrians became unavoidable. In April 1981 the whole area was on fire. The Syrians bombarded Zahleh. The net woven by Bashir began to close. Bashir sent more units. The Syrians reacted by sending commando units and helicopters. Bashir's units were being pounded; they had no chance against the Syrian army. But Bashir knew that all was going according to his plan. This was the time to call the Mossad people. Through the Israeli agents at Jounieh he sent an SOS call to Jerusalem:

FROM THE ISRAELI PRESS 183

"You must save us. An investment of many years will be lost. The Syrians are taking over," and other such "convincing reasons" that the cunning Bashir knew Mossad would buy. And indeed, these Israeli agents who were supposed to warn Israel and to give a cool, objective, open-eyed and credible estimate swallowed the bait. Telegrams went out rapidly from Jounieh to Jerusalem and were almost hysterical in tone. The Israeli government, which could not decide how to react, was in fact already bound by its commitment to the Phalange. At the same time, there was someone who grasped at last that Bashir had deceived him and was dangerous. But Begin refused to accept this evaluation since the concept built by Mossad tied Begin into a commitment that a man of principles like himself would not retreat from. The government gave orders to the army to act, and the air force shot down two Syrian helicopters. The rest of the story is written in the history books of the war in Lebanon: the Syrians reacted by posting missiles in the Bekaa, tension rose sky high and Begin said that Rafel and Yanush are prepared, and Bashir Gemayel smiled. The Mossad people in Jounieh smiled as well; their client was satisfied, and they believed that was good for the State of Israel. They were captivated by their own concept and continued to prepare the way for Bashir to reach presidential office on the targeted date of September 1982.

While Menahem Begin held the Ministry of Defense, Mossad managed to persuade others with its Lebanese concept, but there was still some hesitation in Jerusalem as to how far Israel should be committed to the Christians in the north of Lebanon. When Arik [Ariel] Sharon was appointed Minister of Defense at the end of summer 1981, all the above parties found themselves partners in a totally dif-

ferent game. It took Sharon only three months of study to learn that Mossad's involvement with the Phalange was a silver plate for him. Mossad's concept fitted very well with the first stage of his grand strategic plan. A fatal blow to the PLO and a new order in Lebanon were to be a promising beginning. In January, Sharon visited Jounieh to arrange matters with Bashir. The Mossad men were the overpleased matchmakers, of course. They were sure that Sharon would sell their concept and guide the steps and they were not disappointed.

The "National Defense Unit" (NDU) of the Ministry of Defense became a powerful instrument in Sharon's hands. Some of the officers serving in the NDU had served in MI in the past. Under the new regime they enjoyed attacking all MI position papers. Sharon's directions were to disregard trivialities and specific data and to concentrate on the general concept. This atmosphere at the Ministry of Defense was of course fertile ground for Mossad. The agents continued to send in information, and in Jerusalem the details were worked into position papers which always encouraged Mossad and praised it. Representatives of MI and the Northern Command had no chance with their differing positions in the decisive discussions. It was soon clear that Sharon himself made all the decisions. He fired, and the NDU surrounded the mark with a target-like circle of data and estimates proving that he had hit the target. Those who disputed this position had no chance in other areas, such as government discussions or the Knesset Committee for Foreign and Security Affairs. Sharon always came better prepared than all the others, with many documents, maps and position papers. The NDU collected data for him over the heads of all the army men, and he could always base all his claims on Mossad.

reports. At such meetings Sharon always had some loyal partners, and one has to admit that he knew how to make use of them. The general director of the Foreign Office was Dave Kimche, an ex-Mossad man, one of those who formulated Mossad's Lebanese position and who invested many years in developing it. The Chief of Staff, Eitan, made many remarks that earned him the nickname of "Phalangist." When Efraim Foran, Begin's military assistant, resigned, Menachem Begin lost his last objective contacts with the true feelings of the army, and Sharon's way to Beirut was open.

By the end of summer 1981, Yanush Ben-Gal finished serving as the commander of the Northern Command and was replaced by General Amir Drori. We must note here that Yanush believed that there was something for Israel to seek in Beirut, but even in his boldest scenarios he did not dream that Mossad would go so far in order to save Haddad. But by that time, Yanush was powerless as far as the real political and strategic decisions were concerned. Sharon would not speak with him; Yanush commanded the Israeli forces in the eastern front and conducted the war against the Syrians, but Sharon didn't visit his headquarters even once. Amir Drori is not the type to raise a scandal at a government meeting or staff meetings in the Ministry of Defense. He is a true soldier. Whenever he could, he presented the Northern Command position, but he had no chance against the joint front, Mossad, NDU, Sharon.

The army did not believe that Bashir would be elected to the presidency. No one believed that Mossad, which they regarded as a marginal part of the system, would manage to drag Israel into deep involvement in the Lebanese elections. The hardest time for the Northern Command were the days between Bashir's elec-

tion and his death. The events of the Lebanese "democratic" elections proved that no response of the system would be surprising any more.

There were IDF officers who realized what was happening, and more and more of them could be seen together with the Phalange at Jounieh and Beirut. The Mossad people were the heroes of the day. Amir Drori refrained from any social contacts with the Phalange. He limited his contacts with them to the minimum necessary.

At joint meetings of Israeli officers and Phalange, Bashir demanded: "Don't leave Beirut yet. Give us a few weeks and we will get organized. We will control the business," promised Bashir—and had only one humble request of the Israeli Army: please disarm the Druze and Palestinian forces. Any sensible person should have understood that what was later to be known as the massacre of Sabra and Shatila was only a vegetarian curiosity in the framework of the general murder which was defined as "getting organized."

In order to write this article I sat long hours with people who can be defined as close to the intelligence community. The concept of a journalist is very strange to them. And here I sit with them and I hear frightening and fascinating stories from them. I hear painful definitions and strong words. I feel deep frustration and not a small amount of anger. Why are you telling me all this? The question becomes almost unavoidable. They look at each other, and the oldest one among them replies: "In a well-ordered state such as England, we would have gone to some senior personality in Whitehall. After a short and secret investigation some people would have been given a modest pension, and would have gone to live in a modest mansion somewhere in the country on the shores of a stream for the rest of their

FROM THE ISRAELI PRESS 185

lives. In the US, the *Washington Post* would get hold of the story, and after a public scandal and sharp attacks the president would deliver a personal message on TV and then go to play golf. In any state behind the iron curtain no doubt some people would have been stood against the wall. And here: "...," he sighs. "Believe me, we warned; we cried, we resigned, we warned; and it was like pissing into the sea."

Now the army is busy implementing the Haddad concept in South Lebanon. They are now implementing plans in South Lebanon, plans which were prepared six months ago, plans rejected by the Mossad experts as conventional and unimaginative. Six months in Lebanon. Six months with a terrible daily blood price. The Israeli representatives at the negotiations with Lebanon are now struggling to save something of that grand strategy that emerged from the school of Mossad and Sharon, and fate must be smiling ironically, since the head of the Israeli delegations to these talks is Dave Kimche, the man who was head of the Lebanon desk in Mossad for many years.

### THE HISTADRUT AND DISCRIMINATION

The Israeli trade union organization, Histadrut, has long given tacit support to policies which discriminate against Palestinian workers in Israel, whether they are Israeli citizens or Palestinians from the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. An article by journalist Avshalom Kaveh in the Hebrew daily *Al Hamishmar* (April 1, 1983) described the situation for the Palestinian worker in the Tel Aviv area, and showed Histadrut's failure to encourage any feeling of solidarity in the Israeli Jewish worker for his Palestinian counterpart.

Many factories in the center of Israel, and especially in the textile and metal sectors, are now facing real difficulties. Another of the fruits of the 1967 war, which some fools still call the war of victory, was the abundance of cheap labor\* that was followed by neglect of technology, and that is maybe the main reason for the deterioration of these factories. Haim Saror, member of the Tel Aviv Workers Council of Histadrut claims, "The Jewish brain stopped thinking with the invasion of cheap labor; we stopped thinking about progress and modern technology. Until 1967 the food, textile, construction and metal industries were our source of pride. Now it is no longer so." When a Jewish worker leaves a production line, the employer hurries to replace him with an Arab worker. It is true that few Jews seek work in these branches, but the employers are also to blame for this sad situation: the flight of Jewish labor from manual work. The average employer doesn't bother to seek, encourage, invest and pay for it.

Cheap labor also damages the organized worker. Because the employer has an unlimited source of labor in the occupied territories, he can threaten the organized worker, whether Jewish or Arab Israeli citizen, with dismissal, since he can be replaced by someone else who will do. The Tel Aviv Workers Council has to deal with this problem. Tens of thousands of workers are not organized and in the end, says Haim Saror, "We have difficulties in protecting the Jewish worker."

For the employer the unorganized worker is a financial paradise. He "saves" on social benefits up to 45 percent. The unorganized worker is paid directly and does not pay taxes. There is no control, and

\* i.e., Palestinian workers from the newly occupied territories—Ed.



even the official Labor Exchange, that did attempt to control this situation, has long since given up. This has created social anti-norms that affect our lives in many ways. Haim Saror and other Israeli trade unionists say quite clearly, "We have no way to control the situation." Workers from the [occupied] territories save money and, after six or seven years in industry, buy land in their village and leave work. "Their ties to the land are stronger than to industry." One example of how the organized workers suffer from this situation is the wholesale vegetable and fruit market in Tel Aviv. Biderman, a porters company, used to employ Jews and Arabs from Israel. After 1967, workers from the territories arrived and were absorbed into the company. They were employed according to the usual terms. Gradually, the wholesale dealers found out that it would not only be cheaper but also more convenient to deal directly with the Arab porters, and they cancelled their contracts with Biderman and took over the workers from the territories. The Arab workers earn more directly now, but they are still exploited to the same extent when, for example, they have to sleep in the store houses as well as serve as guards for very low wages. This damaged the Biderman porters company. The Labor Exchange knows what is going on, but does not dare to interfere in matters of the market, fearing the wholesale merchants will close down the market.

Shlomo Barak of the Tel Aviv Workers Council speaks about discrimination and deprivation "that cannot be fought." He tells us about one of the factories in Ben Avigdor Street where half the workers are Arabs and half are Jews. The union negotiated employer's participation in holiday payments. But the employer is not willing to pay similar sums to workers

from the territories, claiming that he already pays a fortune for their transport expenses. He claims that as they are not Israeli citizens, he does not have to pay. The Jews in the factory won't strike for their fellow workers. So where is international solidarity?

Haim Saror: "International workers' solidarity can be seen in the personal treatment of the workers by the trade union activists." He says that with a bitter smile. He doesn't expect the Jews to participate in this issue. The employers want to reach a situation in which all Arab workers, Israelis and non-Israelis, will be non-union members and won't know too much about such matters.

It is worthwhile listening to Shlomo Barak: "According to my management rules, within the trade union Arabs cannot be members of the workers council. They must receive full rights, but they cannot represent workers. I cannot be sure that workers from the territories won't incite the public, and it seems to me that the Arab worker is not particularly interested in developing Israeli industry; in any case, the Jewish worker wouldn't accept the Arab as his superior." Think about that.

The trade union has no control over the dismissal of Arab workers from the territories and the employers can do as they wish. Tel Aviv cooperatives, such as "Ha'Argaz," give them full union protection, but they are the exception. The worst working conditions can be found in the garages. Only two or three of them have joined the collective agreements and the rest are thus out of the control of the trade union and the Labor Exchange.

Baruch Lazarovitz deals with several metal factories in Tel Aviv. He says that the discrimination in the matter of benefits is one of the most difficult issues to deal with. Haim Saror: "This situation